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This book is a collective effort in more ways than we can describe. 
From conceptualizing the proj ect, securing the funding, assembling 
the team, all the way to developing the international network to sup-
port the research and conversations that we wanted to have, we have 
relied on colleagues and friends in Rus sia, the US, France, the UK, and 
the Netherlands, including several we made along the way. From Rus sia 
with Code is the product of a three- year effort by a team of scholars 
connected to the Science and Technology Studies (sts) Center at the 
Eu ro pean University at Saint Petersburg (eusp), funded by a grant 
from the Ministry of Education and Science of the Rus sian Federation 
for the study of high- skill brain drain. This proj ect would not have 
been pos si ble without the eusp’s unique intellectual and interdisci-
plinary environment and the Ministry’s support for the extensive and 
multisited research required by our research topic.
As in all collective enterprises, especially academic ones, the most 
impor tant persons are not necessarily the most vis i ble. In our case, 
they do not appear on the book cover nor in the list of contributors, 
and yet they have been pres ent throughout the book, working next to 
it, and making it pos si ble. Olga Dragan, eusp’s finance officer, has cru-
cially supported the proj ect from its inception in January 2013, when 
it was only a grant application, all the way through its slow meta-
morphosis into the book you are reading. With the help of Natalia 
Voinova, Olga steered the ship clear of all bureaucratic shoals, even 
when the po liti cal campaigns against the eusp turned bureaucratic 
rules into something  else.
A relatively recent arrival on the Rus sian academic landscape, the 
eusp is at once a research center and the leading private higher- degree- 
granting social science institution in Rus sia, ranking  every year in the 
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top five of all Rus sian universities. A proj ect of this scale would not have 
been pos si ble without the support that the sts Center was fortunate to re-
ceive from the other departments, especially Anthropology, History, Sociol-
ogy, Po liti cal Science, and Economics. While enjoying their support, it has 
also been a plea sure to witness the “positive spillovers” that our proj ect has 
enabled, inserting sts questions and approaches into conversations with 
colleagues across the social sciences and into the research that the gradu ate 
students have been conceptualizing and pursuing.
We  were fortunate when Zinaida Vasilyeva accepted our invitation to be-
come the executive director of the proj ect. Since the proj ect’s inception, she 
skillfully negotiated the contrasting needs and desires of the academic scholars 
and of the multilayered bureaucratic world in which the proj ect grew and 
operated. In this, she was helped throughout by Anastasia Karkacheva, who 
added to the job description of assistant director her precious and much- 
appreciated design skills. Diana Kurkovsky West joined the proj ect as a re-
searcher in 2014, quickly moving to direct the sts Center in 2016, with the 
support of Olga Sezneva who took leave from her faculty position in Am-
sterdam to help strengthen and broaden the academic agenda and programs 
of the Center while also connecting it to Saint Petersburg’s broader cultural 
circles and networks. Liliia Zemnukhova was part of the research proj-
ect from the beginning, always contributing much- appreciated problem- 
solving skills and contagious energy. Mélanie Feakins generously shared with 
us her knowledge and experience of Rus sian offshoring in the it business, 
providing crucial fieldwork contacts and suggestions.
In Paris, Sciences Po supported the completion of the book through its 
Scientific Advisory Board funding in 2014. Medialab was the perfect insti-
tution to conduct the proj ect while in Paris. Michel Gardette and Bruno 
Latour  were understanding enough to let Vincent Lépinay finish the proj-
ect in Saint Petersburg while holding a teaching position in Paris. In Davis, 
California, the Center for Science and Innovation Studies and the faculty of 
the Science and Technology Studies Program supported and participated 
in the proj ect, providing a welcoming intellectual and institutional home to 
some of our Rus sian visitors. Martin Kenney lent his expertise in innovation 
studies and regional development, making him one of our most helpful col-
laborators, brainstorming with our team both in Saint Petersburg and Davis.
Andrei Mogoutov provided invaluable guidance to the proj ect partici-
pants pursuing quantitative analyses of the patterns of collaboration and 
publication of Rus sian computer scientists. Michael Gordin, Loren Graham, 
Alexei Grinbaum, David Kaiser, and Martin Kenney joined our summer 
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school in 2014, providing extensive and insightful comments on the team’s 
work. Their generous presence and critical input  were as useful as the inspi-
ration that their work triggered. Harley Balzer, Slava Gerovich, Martin Gi-
raudeau, and Ben Peters kindly discussed with us versions of this book and 
provided much- needed advice, as did Yuri Takhteyev on the earlier fram-
ing of the proj ect. As eusp’s vice- rector, Boris Kolonitsky provided much- 
needed support and connections. Olga Sezneva, Diana Kurkovsky West, 
Mikhail Sokolov, Ilya Utekhin, Artemy Magun, Anatoly Pinsky, Stephanie 
Dick, and Jay West have all supervised and advised students at the sts Cen-
ter. As the proj ect was reaching its completion, Veljko Vujacic read the book 
manuscript and provided extensive and incisive comments that contributed 
to shaping it in its current form. Special thanks go to Beatrice Lewin Dumin 
whose editing skills turned an assemblage of stylistically unruly essays into 
a coherent volume.
Preliminary versions of this book’s chapters  were presented at a variety 
of conferences: “From Streets to Boardrooms: Internet Activism and Business 
Strategies,” September 18–19, 2013, eusp; “Crossbreeding sts and Innovation 
Studies,” December 7–8, 2013, eusp; “Innovating Rus sia: Computer Science 
and Entrepreneurship in Historical Perspective,” December  9–10, 2013, 
eusp; “Explorers and Pirates: Digital Creators and the Creation of Value,” 
June 18–19, 2014, eusp; “Summer School on Rus sian Computer Scientists,” 
June 16, 17, and 20, 2014, eusp; “Garage Innovation,” September 26–27, 2014, 
eusp; “Central and Eastern Eu ro pean Software Engineering Conference,” 
October 23–25, 2014, Digital October Center, Moscow; “Scientific Diaspora,” 
December 5–6, 2014, eusp; “Summer School on Rus sian Computer Scien-
tists,” June 22–24, 2015, eusp; “sts Winter School,” January 8–13, 2016, Ven-
ice International University, Italy; Association for Slavic, East Eu ro pean and 
Eurasian Studies Conference, November 20, 2016, Washington, DC; “Soviet 
Computing Workshop,” November 29, 2016, uc Davis; “History of Science 
Seminar,” June 16, 2017, Eu ro pean Institute, Florence, Italy. We wish to thank 
all  those who provided us with comments, criticism, and support during the 
many discussions we had at  these conferences.
This book would not have seen the light of day  were it not for the in-
stitutional energy and imagination of Oleg Kharkhordin, who served as 
eusp’s rector during most of the duration of the proj ect. He first invited one 
of us (Vincent Lépinay) to take the lead of the sts Center he had recently 
launched at eusp, and his work on Rus sian high- tech entrepreneurship has 
been a constant reference. This book extends  those intellectual conversa-
tions and the institutional proj ect that framed them. The team of Rus sian 
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and international scholars and networks that have grown around the “mega-
grant” proj ect have contributed to Oleg’s goal of solidifying the eusp Center’s 
role as the premier sts hub in Russia— a country where our already inter-
disciplinary field needs to add additional perspectives to make sense of the 
many diff er ent scenarios emerging at the intersection of dramatic historical 
changes, geo graph i cal specificities, and mobilities. While his name does not 
appear among the book’s contributors, Oleg has been a full- fledged collabo-
rator, from his early support of our “megagrant” application to innumerable 
discussions and brainstorming sessions throughout the proj ect. The plea sure 
associated with the completion of this book is also tinged by the sadness of 
acknowledging the closure of the proj ect, but we hope that the relations of 
intellectual kinship with Oleg and the faculty and students of the eusp  will 
spawn more initiatives and conversations, in Saint Petersburg and elsewhere.
Introduction
RUS SIAN ECONOMIES OF CODES
Mario Biagioli and Vincent Antonin Lépinay
Three recent vignettes of Rus sian information technology (it) education, 
migration, entrepreneurship, and activism mark the bound aries of this 
proj ect, as well as some of its analytical foci.
1
“I tell you honestly and openly—if you want to harm the coun-
try, invest in training it specialists in the Rus sian Federation. 
You  couldn’t harm Rus sia more.”1 With this stunning remark, 
Dmitry Marinichev, Rus sia’s presidential internet ombuds-
man, addressed it entrepreneurs, government officials, and 
academics in October 2015 at a meeting of the Rus sian Civic 
Chamber to discuss import substitution— the replacement 
(due to Western sanctions) of foreign- produced technologies 
with Rus sian ones. Accepting as a fact the isolationist tenden-
cies of the Vladimir Putin government, the West’s growing 
hostility  toward Rus sia, and the lack of a Rus sian innovation 
ecosystem that could sustain the production of domestically 
and internationally competitive digital technologies, Marin-
ichev argued that Rus sia was already cut off from global inno-
vation networks and that, therefore, “we can give technology to 
other countries only when we have a military presence [ there]. 
When other countries  will not have an alternative option than 
to get it from us.”
Considerable uproar ensued, but Marinichev held his line 
in a follow-up interview with Gazeta:
I am saying absolutely banal  things, which have been well 
known since the time of the Roman Empire. First an army 
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comes on a territory, then merchants, and then  there is state power 
and a market. It’s only that way, and no other way. Therefore if at a 
government level we choose the regimen of “Rus sia against all,” then 
we  will have no chance to sell our products and technologies except 
by conducting geopo liti cal expansion in the world. (Evstifeyev 2015).
He then continued:
A clearly- expressed confrontation is underway between the 
Western world and Rus sia.  Whether Rus sia is guilty  here or not 
is not impor tant. What’s impor tant is the status quo, and it is im-
possible to discuss technological export and import substitution 
 because we must produce every thing ourselves totally and com-
pletely. In that context, preparing it specialists for foreign-based 
technologies is essentially to undermine Rus sia’s sovereignty. . . .  I 
 don’t want to look at that option  because it is unacceptable. We have 
all managed to live as citizens of the global world, freely moving 
about— a vacation in Italy, a merry- go- round  ride in Amer i ca. But 
it could happen that every thing  will change. And the question of 
what method of technology transfer to use lies on that plane— who 
we are and what we want and where. (Evstifeyev 2015)
2
Exploring his com pany’s server in 2015, Dmitry Korobov, a pro-
grammer at the Rus sian com pany Yandex, found a folder containing 
the source code of its search engine, which he proceeded to down-
load and then tried to sell. Yandex is not simply a Rus sian it com-
pany, but more like the Rus sian it com pany. Started in 1997, it quickly 
outperformed Google in Rus sia (controlling about 60  percent of the 
market), becoming one of the few darlings of foreign investors and 
opening its own research center in Silicon Valley. It is considered the 
fourth- largest search engine in the world.
At first, Korobov looked for buyers on the darknet, but he then 
openly approached nix, an electronics retail com pany where he had 
acquaintances. Need, not greed, may have motivated Korobov, who 
claimed to sell the stolen software in order to launch his own startup, 
leave Yandex, and become an entrepreneur. He seems to have had 
poor business sense, though, asking $28,000 for software that may 
have been worth $14 million; apparently equally oblivious to the fact 
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that $28,000 would hardly have paid office rent in Moscow for a 
year, let alone launched a startup. With the Rus sian security ser vices 
(fsb) scouring the darknet on a daily basis to locate signs of suspi-
cious activities, Korobov was easily lured into meeting a prospective 
buyer who handcuffed him before he could sing the praises of the 
sophisticated system he was trying to sell. He received a suspended 
sentence of two years in jail— a lenient punishment that prob ably 
reflects the court’s perception of Korobov’s actions as naively, rather 
than professionally, criminal (Degeler 2015).
3
Virtual Rynda: The Atlas of Help is a platform “to support and 
facilitate mutual aid and crowdsourced solutions to diff er ent types of 
prob lems affecting Rus sian citizens” (Asmolov 2014). It emerged in 
the wake of the 2010 wildfires that ravaged the forested areas around 
Moscow. Help Map (Wildfires.ru) was set up on the model of Usha-
hidi, a crowdsourcing platform initially developed in  Kenya in 2008 
to help collect and report evidence of vio lence and fraud. Help Map 
succeeded beyond all expectations, leading its found ers to consoli-
date their social experience of mutual help and collective data gath-
ering into a platform that could be used in a variety of situations. 
As a response to the poor  handling of the disaster by local authori-
ties and as an active decision to equip citizens with new modes of 
coordination, Help Map both facilitated and managed a success-
ful grassroots outpouring of aid and collaboration. In programming 
and design terms it effectively translated a massive and other wise 
disor ga nized stream of compassion into  human action, and in so 
 doing it reenacted an old Soviet po liti cal philosophy. Nearly two de-
cades  after the collapse of the USSR, it proudly brought back the 
notion of the public good, this time in the form of a city threatened 
by smoke.
Interestingly, the  people  behind Help Map only met in person 
 after the site had already achieved its collaborative goal. Its succes-
sor, Virtual Rynda, is one among many such proj ects harnessing the 
power of virtual connectedness to address issues that are both local 
and broadly shared across constituencies— information, needs, and 
agendas that po liti cal authorities would other wise leave unseen. 
 These citizen- produced digital platforms are, thus, not just tools for 
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emergency management or other forms of practical help but rather 
vectors of a new public sphere, their very existence a fin ger that 
points to a neglectful or willfully blind state.
< / >
Taken together,  these three con temporary vignettes function as signposts 
of the techno- scientific and po liti cal field engaged in this book— a field that 
kept changing as we  were studying it. When we started mapping the brain 
drain and global migrations of Rus sian computer scientists, software prac-
ti tion ers, and it specialists to Finland, the UK, Israel, the US, and beyond 
we expected the diasporic pro cess to be the primary agent of change and 
hybridization of  people who other wise shared comparable professional pro-
files, educational backgrounds, and technical skills. However, as soon as we 
went into the field— a field that was new to us and for which we had limited 
background lit er a ture to guide us—we  were confronted with the heteroge-
neity and fluidity of our subjects prior to their diasporas.
One can recognize an academic computer scientist virtually anywhere 
in the world by reference to standardized forms of academic training, pub-
lication venues, professional roles, and disciplinary networks. The relatively 
stable profile of Rus sian academic computer scientists was, however, more 
the exception than the rule among the subjects of our study. Unlike “com-
puter scientist,” terms like “software practitioner,” “it entrepreneur,” or 
“hacktivist”  were remarkably difficult to specify in the Rus sian context, not 
just  because they indexed new professions and roles, but  because Russia— 
the sociocultural and po liti cal framework in which  these changes  were tak-
ing place— was itself a work in pro gress (Yurchak 2005). It quickly became 
apparent, therefore, that defining our subject was  going to be an impor tant 
and ongoing research question— more a heuristic win dow than a prob lem. 
(When we refer to them as “Rus sian computer scientists,” or rcs, we use that 
term  under erasure.)
What is commonly referred to as the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s was nothing short of a cultural revolution that triggered a rather 
unique kind of diaspora. Traditional revolutions often trigger migrations of 
members of the losing faction ( people who had clear social identities like, 
say, aristocrats  after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917), but the transition to 
post- Soviet Rus sia spawned a diaspora of subjects that  were in the pro cess 
of refashioning themselves into something  else. The “Rus sian software prac-
ti tion ers” we have been following around  were not seeking refuge in other 
communist enclaves abroad to hold on to their previous identities, but  were 
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instead technically skilled  people who, while participating in some emergent 
post- Soviet subjecthood, often found themselves constrained by the post- 
Soviet context itself. Being a “tech entrepreneur” in post- Soviet Rus sia does 
not mean occupying a specific preestablished role, but rather constructing 
a new subject position— one that is as new as that of the hacktivist and the 
forms of po liti cal participation associated with that term.
 After 1991, the country we now call the Rus sian Federation migrated 
 toward a cap i tal ist economy, enabled the mobility of its citizens both within 
and beyond its borders, renegotiated its relation with the former Soviet re-
publics, and attempted to pivot from extractive industries to a “knowledge 
economy,” as well as to re orient its famous and extensive techno- scientific 
apparatus from its traditional centralized, top- down, and military- oriented 
structure  toward a more horizontal and entrepreneurial culture aimed at 
technologies and products for private industries and the consumer market. 
The  people whose movements we sought to understand  were participants 
and actors in many of  these changes, as well as in the emergence of a new 
po liti cal sphere made pos si ble by the internet and digital media. It became 
clear, then, that we needed to look both at  those who opted to refashion 
themselves in situ, and  those who instead engaged that refashioning pro cess 
in diasporic settings. Rather than simply the opposite of “staying put,” moving 
was a diff er ent facet of a pro cess of emergent change that was affecting all 
post- Soviet subjects. This emphasis on emergence ( whether geo graph i cally 
anchored in Rus sia or not) is reflected in the layout of our chapters, which 
map both the new post- Soviet configurations of software prac ti tion ers, en-
trepreneurs, and hacktivists from Saint Petersburg to Vladivostok, as well as 
some of the assemblages they have constructed abroad.
At the same time, while it became difficult or plainly impossible for us to 
describe exactly what “Rus sian” meant in the midst of all  these changes, it was 
equally clear that the conditions, resources, constraints, and pos si ble trajecto-
ries for all  these developments  were genealogically specific to “Rus sia.” The 
global mobility of it specialists,2 software theft, and grassroots web- based 
initiatives is nothing new. Still, the remarkable mobility of it specialists, es-
pecially highly skilled individuals such as  those who have traditionally been 
produced by the Soviet and then Rus sian pedagogical system, is a particu-
larly thorny issue for this country  because it turns a pedagogical strength 
into an economic and possibly even po liti cal threat. In addition to the prob-
lems that brain drain poses to all countries,  here it is feared to contribute, at 
least in Marinichev’s neo– Cold War perspective, to “undermin[ing] Rus sian 
sovereignty.” Unlike other countries that have been able to stem the loss of 
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academics and entrepreneurs, create opportunities for returnees, or ben-
efit from networks developed through the back- and- forth mobility of their 
highly skilled workers, Rus sia continues to face a one- directional flow, the 
pace of which seems to be accelerating in response to an increasingly unset-
tled po liti cal environment at home (Balzer 2011; Kuznetsov 2006; Luo and 
Wang 2001; Saxenian 2007; Wang 2015). Recent surveys show that in 2014 
the emigration of Rus sian scientists and entrepreneurs was by a wide margin 
the highest since 1999 (Dezhina 2015, 330). It is this trend that Marinichev 
was addressing in his radical 2015 speech before the Rus sian Civic Chamber: 
“All the programmers  will instantly move abroad. That is the practice of the 
last two years” (quoted in Fitzpatrick 2015a).
METHODS FOR MOVING POPULATIONS
From Rus sia with Code analyzes changing populations of techno- scientific 
prac ti tion ers and entrepreneurs. As indicated by the three vignettes,  these 
are heterogeneous populations without essential features or stable identities. 
They mutate as they move, in Rus sia and abroad, turning communist math-
ematicians into post- Soviet software entrepreneurs, po liti cal activists into 
civic hackers, academic theoreticians into entrepreneurs, Jews in Rus sia 
into Rus sians in Israel, used- car salesmen in Vladivostok into web designers, 
kgb technicians into US security specialists, nationalists into cosmopolitans, 
and back to nationalists,  etc.
The book is the outcome of over three hundred in- depth interviews 
 conducted over a three- year period (from 2013 through 2015) in Rus sia and 
around the world by a team of Rus sian, US, French, and Dutch scholars.3 
While the prac ti tion ers we have studied are regularly covered by popu lar 
media (Bowles 2017; Shane, Sanger, and Perlroth 2017), discussed in busi-
ness publications, and reported upon in foreign- policy think tanks, they 
have as a  whole received scant scholarly attention, and almost none in aca-
demic Anglophone lit er a ture (Bardham and Kroll 2006; Borjas and Doran 
2012; Feakins 2009; Freinkman, Gonchar, and Kuznetsov 2013; Ganguli 2015; 
Lonkila 2011). The Rus sian it sphere is one of successful private enterprises, 
greatly varying in size. Despite the limited availability of venture capital in 
Rus sia, Yandex and Kaspersky have grown into large companies on par with 
some of their Silicon Valley competitors. At the other end of the spectrum, 
thousands of self- employed programmers work on proj ects without formal 
 labor contracts. Despite the efforts of it trade associations like Russoft to 
understand market morphology and the population of programmers actu-
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ally working in Rus sia, the  actual lay of the land for both companies and 
individual prac ti tion ers has been highly speculative. From Rus sia with Code 
offers a much more granular picture of the specific, often daily practices of 
 these actors than can be provided by statistical aggregations or high- level 
policy papers. It provides a unique win dow onto a Rus sia that lies beyond 
the headlines of po liti cal and economic media reports— a Rus sia of techni-
cians, but also of civic hackers who are trying to reshape Rus sian politics 
from the bottom up, strongly committed to avoiding both old Soviet and 
neoliberal Western po liti cal templates.
Methodologically heterogeneous, our proj ect is inspired by multisited 
ethnography, though in this case diff er ent sites are analyzed by diff er ent 
chapters authored by diff er ent scholars. The chapters sample diff er ent prac-
tices, goals, and sites of Rus sian computer scientists, software specialists, 
hackers, and it entrepreneurs, but are not aimed at constructing a holistic 
comparative global picture. Rather,
comparison emerges from putting questions to an emergent object of 
study whose contours, sites, and relationships are not known beforehand, 
but are themselves a contribution of making an account that has diff er ent, 
complexly connected real- world sites of investigation. The object of study 
is ultimately mobile and multiply situated, so any ethnography of such an 
object  will have a comparative dimension that is integral to it, in the form 
of juxtapositions of phenomena that conventionally have appeared to be 
(or conceptually have been kept) “worlds apart.” Comparison re- enters the 
very act of ethnographic specification by a research design of juxtaposi-
tions in which the global is collapsed into and made an integral of parallel, 
related local situations rather than something monolithic or external to 
them. (Marcus 1995, 102)
In par tic u lar, we believe that George Marcus’s critique of the conception 
of the global as something monolithic or external to local situations may be 
usefully applied to Rus sia itself. The local materials and analyses put forward 
by the chapters are not framed by a preset relationship with “Rus sia” as a 
stable framework that contextualizes  these local studies and organizes their 
comparisons, but are presented as sites in which post- Soviet Rus sia is con-
structed through and in relation with  those local situations.
The perspectives that we have borrowed both from multisited ethnogra-
phies and from science and technology studies turn From Rus sia with Code 
into a study of mobilities that does not easily fit the template of diaspora stud-
ies. A focus on the movement (domestic and global) and on the constantly 
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outward gaze of highly skilled prac ti tion ers is central to the book, but it 
is articulated primarily through an attention to the technological specific-
ity of this population— code, coding skills and practices, and the social as-
semblages that are sometimes built through and around code— and how 
that frames both their migration options and their sense of being “Rus sian” 
(which often collides with the professional identity that comes with being a 
programmer, a computer scientist, or an it person). This is a population in 
movement and whose movements—as shown by Marinichev’s remarks about 
the challenges that it brain drain poses to Rus sian sovereignty— have created 
issues for a state that has long assigned populations to their specific cities.
While  there may seem to be some  family resemblance between our chap-
ters and the genre of diaspora studies, the research object is quite diff er-
ent. Our questions do not concern the transformative effects of distance on 
memories of and connection to the motherland, or on the organ ization of 
diasporic communities. That is not only  because the Rus sian motherland 
is an openly unstable construct, but especially  because “distance” is not the 
right concept to capture the inherently tense relation between two very dif-
fer ent modalities of identity formation that we find in our material. One is 
tied to the specific skills of the mi grant prac ti tion ers of a technical discipline 
with inherently fuzzy bound aries and a deterritorialized ethos— skills that 
are conducive to the formation of distinctly nondiasporic communities and 
publics, like  those associated with the  free software and open source move-
ments. The other modality of identity formation is, instead, virtually antitheti-
cal to the first one, developed by a state with a long tradition of population 
control. At the same time, the technical skills that  these prac ti tion ers are in-
ternationally appreciated for and identified with— the same skills that make 
them highly moveable and put them on a centrifugal trajectory away from 
the pull of the Rus sian state— are skills they have developed through the 
very specific Rus sian (and formerly Soviet) educational system.
This unavoidable tension questions the meaning of both “diasporic pop-
ulation” and “motherland,” but it also complicates in in ter est ing ways the 
multisited stories told in this volume. Multisited studies have treated seri-
ously the territories of activities that used to be described without attention 
to their spatiality— hence the typical study of local and distributed deploy-
ments of one object, like a drug tracked from the labs of the phar ma ceu ti cal 
com pany designing it in Cambridge to the offices of the medical doctors 
prescribing it in Argentina and the websites where patients comment on the 
effects of its consumption on their health. But despite this grounding and 
spatialization of the object and its movements and transformations, multi-
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sited analyses have tended to treat territories as relative coordinates of ob-
jects, which are often as emergent as their trajectories.
But while Rus sian computer scientists and it specialists are as dispersed 
across the world as phar ma ceu ti cal drugs are, their movements also make 
vis i ble, and make sense from, a specific coordinate system.  These subjects are 
Rus sian (in the specifically constructed sense discussed above), looking with 
 either frustration or nostalgia to their motherland (often perceived through 
the polarized “Rus sia v. The World” narrative), while si mul ta neously exploit-
ing and reinforcing the “Rus sian software specialists” brand that gives them 
an edge in the global  labor market. In this sense, Rus sia is not just a departure 
point but a point of reference for their movements, including the decision to 
stay put. Their Rus sianness is constructed and ever changing, but it is also 
the proverbial elephant in the room, large enough to inflect the other wise 
uniform coordinate system of multisited ethnographies.
SETTING THE STAGE
Dmitry Marinichev’s frustration is somewhat understandable  because coding, 
unlike most other high- tech disciplines, is predominantly  labor intensive— a 
fact that greatly reduces the government’s pos si ble policy levers. Software 
production’s low capital requirements are what made Rus sia one of the most 
successful countries for the offshoring of high- end coding proj ects imme-
diately  after the collapse of the Soviet Union; all that foreign companies 
needed to do was send over some laptops and a bit of cash and that might 
be enough for a Rus sian techie to start a com pany.4 For example, in 1992 you 
could hire a good programmer for $100 a month. But the other side of this 
same coin is that the Rus sian government finds it very difficult to retain it 
specialists, as compared to retaining or attracting back physicists, chemists, 
or biologists. While the latter require sophisticated and generally expensive 
facilities— and are thus likely to respond to policies that would provide them 
with  these resources5— most it specialists seek jobs rather than laboratories 
or companies.  Because they travel light (and thus easily) the Rus sian govern-
ment can do  little to control their movement short of restricting emigration, 
thus effectively treating them as potential defectors. This is most likely what 
Marinichev had in mind when claiming that “preparing it specialists for 
foreign- base technologies is essentially to undermine Rus sia’s sovereignty.”
Dmitry Korobov’s story also contains specifically Rus sian ele ments: while 
he is certainly not the first software thief we have heard of, his remarks (if 
we are to believe them) point to a dramatic lack of funding opportunities 
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for tech startups. Coders like Korobov are allegedly reduced to theft in 
order to become entrepreneurs, pushing the figurative link between pirates 
and entrepreneurs to a new level (Clay and Phillip 2015; Durant and Vergne 
2012;  Ramadan et al. 2016). But, setting his piratico- entrepreneurial visions 
aside, Korobov (if we are to believe the way he has been represented in the 
media) seemed to have had extraordinarily  little sense of the market value of 
the goods he was selling, or of how to go about planning or executing such 
a heist. Of course, one may be tempted to discount this vignette as a mere 
reflection of Korobov’s limited skill set, but the presence of a significant gap 
between technical ability and entrepreneurial skill has emerged in several 
of our interviews of Rus sian it specialists, suggesting a pattern that moves 
beyond individual specificities.
 There are several true success stories in the Rus sian it industry— Yandex 
being a globally prominent one— but they are the results of extraordinarily 
steep learning curves in business culture, not just technical innovation. In 
the mid-1990s, for instance, budding Rus sian it entrepreneurs lacked not 
only mbas but familiarity with basic business practices. Arkadiy Khotin, the 
founder of Arcadia— one of Saint Petersburg’s earliest software companies 
that is still  going strong  today— recalls that in 1994, when he began work-
ing on proj ects for foreign clients, “I had no idea about how to speak of the 
terms of payment. I had no idea of the concept of  things like retainers. My 
Soviet mentality did not allow me to ask. I was waiting for them to offer. . . . 
[That] was not very good  because when someone asked me how much I 
wanted to be paid for this activity, I had no idea how to arrive at an ap-
propriate figure. . . .  In trying to price a small proj ect I had no idea how to 
say it would be about $500 or it would be in the lower hundreds of dollars” 
(quoted in Lonkila 2011, 28).
 Things  were not much diff er ent in 1996: “I definitely had raised some 
interest but I had a [sic] zero marketing skills including a lack of under-
standing of how to follow-up. I even went [to a meeting in Finland] without 
business cards. They said we  will send you something but they did not even 
know my e- mail address” (Khotin, quoted in Lonkila 2011, 29).6 This was 
clearly not the result of a Soviet- style rejection of bourgeois business men-
tality. On the contrary, what we see in Rus sia from the 1990s all the way up 
to the pres ent is a genuine appreciation— often bordering on mythification—
of the discourse of innovation and entrepreneurship, though not one that 
is always coupled with competence in Western entrepreneurial practices 
and expectations. Since the early 1990s, however,  things have dramatically 
changed. Still, despite a craze for business workshops, online training mate-
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rials, and translations of Western textbooks,  there remains a noticeable gap 
between the level of available mathematical, technical, and coding skills and 
the familiarity with entrepreneurial practices and culture, especially at the 
periphery of the Rus sian Federation.7
This may help to explain why Rus sian programmers tend to do very well 
when they move abroad or are hired by the Rus sian branches of foreign 
companies, that is, in contexts where their technical skills are put to work in 
environments that already have their business organ ization and infrastruc-
ture in place.8 While coding is a skill young Rus sians can learn at school, in 
afterschool computer clubs, in coding competitions, or even on the web, busi-
ness culture is another  matter altogether.9  Those it entrepreneurs who went 
into business just  after the collapse of the Soviet Union typically credit 
their business training not to workshops and classes but to interactions 
with their Western foreign customers— often initiated by informal or simply 
out- of- the- blue email contacts whose rate of success was only slightly better 
than spam. It was through early offshoring work that the first post- Soviet 
generation of coders slowly turned into entrepreneurs, learning their for-
eign clients’ practices and cultures while also learning how to talk to them 
and understand what their expectations  were so as to build trust and, in 
some cases, long- term business relations.
It goes without saying that given the virtual absence of domestic train-
ing resources, neither the informal but remarkably rapid learning pro cess 
nor business opportunities would have been pos si ble without access first 
to FidoNet (from the late 1980s on) and then to Relcom, Free- Net, and the 
internet, which became available in the early 1990s (for  those with some 
 affiliation to a university or academic institute, as several first- wave Rus sian 
entrepreneurs had) (Peters 2016). In a literal sense, the Rus sian it industry 
was itself a product of it. One must also credit the cyberinfrastructure for 
much of the English- language training— however approximate it may have 
been— that Rus sian coders  were able to access early on.10 Despite the in-
creased demand for English- language education in Rus sian schools (where 
high schoolers are now required to learn two foreign languages) and plans 
to introduce a nationwide mandatory En glish test by 2020 (Moscow Times 
2005),  there remains a substantial gap between the English- language profi-
ciency of Rus sian it specialists and  those from competitor countries such as 
India, Ireland,  Korea, and Israel.
Arcadia’s Khotin (who did not seem to know about business cards in 1994 
and was taught how to write proper En glish business letters by a US acquain-
tance around 1998)11 was proud to report in 2009 that his com pany (which 
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now employs close to five hundred  people) is “a top notch specialist in major 
technologies on the Microsoft platform. But overall our strongest point is 
 people management, proj ect management and business pro cess organ ization 
 because this is the most impor tant part. We call it ppp— People, Pro cesses, 
Proj ects” (Cook Report 2009, 22; emphasis in the original). The dramatic 
shift that Arcadia experienced between 1996 and 2009— moving from an 
emphasis on superior coding and low cost to superior people- management 
skills, down to the American- style use of acronyms like “ppp”— was the re-
sult of many interactions with impor tant clients (like Johnson and John-
son) that lasted over years, turning into quasi- partnerships (Cook Report 
2009, 20–21). However, companies  doing offshoring work are not uniformly 
distributed across the Rus sian Federation, but tend to cluster in cities with 
major international airports. The opportunity for informal business training 
through interactions with foreign customers is therefore rarer in the prov-
inces, or for the many it specialists working for the domestic market.12
The widespread imbalance between technical skills and entrepreneurial 
competence, however, ceases to be a prob lem when we look at the third 
vignette about the Virtual Rynda proj ect.  There, substantial it skills are not 
directed  toward the commercial sphere, and platforms and applications are 
not being developed with an eye to selling or licensing; rather, they are seen 
as contributions to the establishment of a new body politic. In  these cases, 
business competence becomes relatively irrelevant compared to technical 
skills and an eye for identifying spaces and win dows of opportunity for 
po liti cal intervention.
The connection between it and demo cratic movements is quite direct in 
Rus sia,  going back to the undoing of the August 1991 attempted coup d’état 
against Mikhail Gorbachev and his reform program. On that occasion, 
according to Rafal Rohozinski:
The programmers at one of Rus sia’s private Net providers— Relcom/
Demos— were among the first to testify to the coup from their offices near 
the Kremlin. Within a few minutes of tanks appearing in Red Square, they 
began broadcasting information to network nodes across the USSR. . . . 
Within hours, they had established a temporary network node at the 
White House and  were e- mailing Yeltsin’s defiant declaration, rejecting the 
legitimacy of the coup committee, to Rus sia’s regions and abroad. . . .  By 
eve ning, the Relcom network was acting as a major channel of informa-
tion between Moscow and the regions. . . .  The information vacuum, a key 
 factor in the coup plotters’ game plan, was filled. (Rohozinski 1999, 1–2)13
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“Civic hackers” remain key players in Rus sia  today, less dramatically but 
much more pervasively than in 1991. For them, it innovation and practice 
is not just a way to develop better and cheaper products or profitable com-
panies, but also a technically sophisticated attempt to develop new forms of 
politics and demo cratic participation. From monitoring elections to filing 
complaints about failing urban infrastructure with the appropriate authori-
ties, their goal is not to achieve “efficiencies” but to change politics. Their 
proj ects are si mul ta neously mundane and utopian, directed at local prob-
lems in the pres ent but aimed at rethinking  future politics at the national 
level. One could say, perhaps, that Rus sian hackers (of both the civic and 
dark variety) are particularly effective  because their practices require virtu-
ally no business skills.
This may also explain the specific kind of attraction that young Rus sian it 
specialists have for the  free software movement, for hacker culture, and for 
informal collaborative worksites like hackerspaces (Davies 2017). In most 
developed countries,  these sympathies often index a commitment to alter-
native business cultures (or plainly antibusiness attitudes), but the Rus sian 
love for  free software and hackerism may reflect the values of a community 
that, for better or for worse, has never been part of a traditional business 
culture. Is the Rus sian hacker a business idiot savant?
AMBIVALENT EXCELLENCE
Rus sian computer scientists are globally sought  after by major it firms, 
their desirability enhanced by the success of teenage Rus sian “prodigies” 
who regularly win the ibm- sponsored Association for Computing Machin-
ery’s International Collegiate Programming Contest (acm icpc) and other 
computer science competitions or ga nized by major players in the it global 
scene, such as Facebook, Microsoft, and Google. (Students from Saint Peters-
burg State University won the 2016 icpc, ahead of Harvard [third] and mit 
[sixth], with five Rus sian universities in the top ten finishers. Between 2000 
and 2016, Rus sian universities won the icpc eleven times.)
The appreciation of the Rus sians’ coding skills is neither new nor limited 
to academic circles. Back in 2001, the “Whitepaper on Offshore Software 
Development” by the American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia described 
the “special characteristics” of Rus sian coders, and their roots: “Rus sia’s 
major advantage over other common offshore software development locales 
is the technical skills and education of its workforce. Rus sia has more 
personnel working in r&d [research and development] than any other 
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country, and ranks 3rd in the world for per capita number of scientists and 
 engineers. . . .  Initially trained for research  careers in physics, engineering, 
or mathe matics, they switched to it instead, having ‘mastered’ new pro-
gramming languages and other skills for which  there was demand” (Ameri-
can Chamber 2001, 4; quoted in Gapova 2006). Jason Horo witz, Sun Micro-
systems’ Rus sian proj ect team man ag er, is more categorical. In his view the 
coders whom Sun employs in Ireland, Israel, India, and the Czech Republic 
“ don’t have anywhere near the talent [of] the Rus sians,” who are specifically 
“stronger at tasks that require deeper mathematical backgrounds” (quoted 
in Peterson 2005).14
But rcs are also followed, at times foreshadowed, by a very diff er ent kind 
of reputation: “ After the fall of the Soviet Union, most Rus sian specialists lost 
their jobs, some went abroad,  others turned to criminal activities. Every one 
knows that the best viruses are written in Rus sia.”15 Hackers originating from 
ex- communist countries— people who might belong to the same commu-
nities as  those of the international computer science competitions— have 
been accused of carry ing out cyberattacks on vari ous Western targets, most 
recently against the US Demo cratic National Committee (dnc). Cold War 
memories are thus reactivated by the narratives that Eu rope and the US have 
recently developed about Rus sian hackers, narratives that si mul ta neously 
celebrate and fear the technical excellence passed down from the Soviet 
 period. The same applies to the other side in the trenches of cyberwarfare. 
One of the most globally respected cybersecurity firms— the Moscow- based 
Kaspersky Labs— was founded by a gradu ate of the Institute of Cryptog-
raphy, Telecommunications, and Computer Science at the Federal Security 
Ser vice of Russia— a school that was previously part of the Technical Faculty 
of the kgb Higher School.
Rus sian hackers are perceived as a worrisome mix of Soviet rigor and 
new Cold cyber- War operatives. At the same time, they can also be seen 
as epitomizing the ultimate non- Soviet subject, not just as embodiments of 
neoliberal ideology but also as self- trained anarchists with  little allegiance to 
institutions, authorities, and nations. And while that mentality may worry 
the ruling classes, it could also be a rather valuable business skill. Accord-
ing to the American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia (2001, 11; quoted in 
Gapova 2006, 5), “many Rus sian software programmers are self- taught, par-
tially explaining their reputation as hackers who can think outside the box.”
 These polarized narratives about the diff er ent figures of the Rus sian com-
puter scientist are not accidental but rather index the tense po liti cal and 
ideological environment of technological innovation in post- Soviet Rus sia. 
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 Because of its nature, it sits exactly at the intersection between technol-
ogy, business, and politics. At the economic level, it may be the Rus sians’ 
best option to end what former President (and now Prime Minister) Dmitry 
Medvedev (2009) called “our country’s humiliating dependence on raw ma-
terials.” At the same time, being so closely connected to communication and 
to the development of new platforms for po liti cal participation, it is a prime 
tool for po liti cal criticism, activism, and whistleblowing. Rus sian computer 
scientists develop software, computational media, and communication net-
works and do so while inhabiting them at the same time. They are the vec-
tors of information in the Rus sian Federation not only  because they work on 
information technologies but  because they are the sector of the population 
that is most exposed to the information disseminated by  those technologies, 
much of it coming from outside the Rus sian Federation. They are techies 
but, precisely as a result of being techies, they are also carriers and dissemi-
nators of new information and modes of thinking.
DREAMS OF INNOVATION ECOLOGIES
During his presidential tenure, Medvedev vowed to return Rus sian science 
and technology to their due rank among the most developed nations of the 
world by making major investments in areas that had been left to their own 
devices as public funding virtually vanished with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in the early 1990s. The restoration of Rus sian techno- scientific pride, 
however, was not aimed at recreating the old Rus sia but at modernizing and 
demo cratizing the pres ent one— “modernization” being mobilized as some-
thing between a keyword and a magic incantation.
Information technologies  were among the “five strategic vectors for the 
economic modernisation of our country” that Medvedev identified in his 
famous “Go Rus sia!” article of September 2009, a manifesto- like text that 
was perhaps more representative of his own personal views and desires than 
 those of the Rus sian government as a  whole. Brain drain was flagged as a key 
prob lem— “Our best specialists are headhunted by the world’s largest com-
panies and universities”— and Rus sian scientists of all stripes  were subse-
quently courted to return to the motherland and participate in a full- fledged 
national modernization effort. This time, however, the modernization pro-
cess was cast as neither imperial nor communist but demo cratic: “ Today 
is the first time in our history that we have a chance to prove to ourselves 
and the world that Rus sia can develop in a demo cratic way.” In that  grand 
plan, information technology was part of both a new economic vision and 
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a new po liti cal proj ect: “The growth of modern information technologies, 
something we  will do our best to facilitate, gives us unpre ce dented oppor-
tunities for the realisation of fundamental po liti cal freedoms, such as free-
dom of speech and assembly. It allows us to identify and eliminate hotbeds 
of corruption. . . .  It facilitates the direct exchange of views and knowledge 
between  people all around the world. Society is becoming more open and 
transparent than ever— even if the ruling class does not necessarily like this” 
(Medvedev 2009).
His frequent references to the “intelligent economy” suggest that Medve-
dev saw information technologies as paving the way  toward both new forms 
of demo cratic politics and new forms of economic value production. Rather 
than the traditional Chicago- style privatization dogma of the young econo-
mists who had set Rus sia on a wild  ride to liberalization in the early 1990s, 
Medvedev and his advisors seemed to model their vision of the new Rus sian 
economy  after the innovation ecologies of mit and greater Boston, or Stan-
ford and Silicon Valley. Information technology was thus key to grow-
ing the new Rus sia, both eco nom ically and po liti cally and, in Medvedev’s 
view, the state (rather than the market alone) was best situated to propel that 
transformation, while si mul ta neously regulating it.
Despite the po liti cal rivalry that characterizes American- Russian rela-
tions, key figures of the Rus sian government like Medvedev and other presi-
dential advisors are enamored of Silicon Valley and, more generally, of the 
US system of science and technology r&d supported by federal agencies 
and by technology transfer policies from the university to the private sector. 
During his highly vis i ble 2010 visit to Palo Alto, Medvedev gave a talk at 
Stanford in which, reading from his iPad, he told his audience: “It is not by 
chance that I came  here. I wanted to see with my own eyes the origins of 
success” (quoted in Joseph 2010). His goal was to create relations and part-
nerships to replicate that success at a new Rus sian “innopolis,” which was to 
be built at Skolkovo, on the outskirts of Moscow. His plans for a new high- 
tech city that would also include Skoltech, a new university modeled  after 
and developed in partnership with mit, testified to  these hopes for the  future 
and techno- scientific aspirations. Skolkovo’s goal was to develop an inno-
vation ecol ogy able to prevent brain drain not just by providing generous 
funding but by creating the conditions of possibility for making scientists 
and entrepreneurs want to remain in Rus sia (Braunerhjelm and Feldman 
2007; Kenney and Mowery 2014; Lecuyer 2005; Saxenian 2000).
Medvedev’s vision, however, has not materialized, not even by a long 
shot.16 Skolkovo never took off the way it had been  imagined, its relation-
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ship with mit souring  after a promising but brief honeymoon. And while 
the Rus sian it sector has kept growing, it has not had the transformative 
effect the former president hoped for. In par tic u lar, the con spic u ous, capital- 
intensive, and forward- looking innovation policies  behind the establishment 
of Skolkovo seem ineffectual at harnessing the potential of the rcs commu-
nity that, more often than not, continues to opt for emigration. Then, fol-
lowing the 2011–12 mobilization of students and liberal groups demanding 
transparency during the presidential election and the accountability of po-
liti cal leaders, the government began to exercise growing control on traditional 
media. The ecosystem of information has changed quite dramatically, to the 
point that the rare, but thriving, sources of critical information in the Rus-
sian Federation (e.g., the tv channel Dozhd’ [Rus sian for “rain”] and the news 
platform Slon) have nearly all dis appeared, thus leaving the web as the sole 
source of alternative information for  people who, by and large, no longer 
believe in the new demo cratic modernizing alliance between government, 
scientists, technologists, and it specialists articulated in “Go Rus sia!”
HISTORICAL PRIDE OR PRES ENT CURSE?
The rcs provide in ter est ing food for thought  because of the technical and 
emergent entrepreneurial dimensions of their work but also  because of the 
multiple ways in which they embody both the imaginaries about a  future 
Rus sia and the tense connections between pres ent Rus sia and its Soviet past.
Rus sian computer scientists are hailed for ushering modernity into post- 
Soviet Rus sia by exemplifying new forms of e- citizenry— the “bright” side 
of hackerism— and offering some hope for the emergence of a strong it in-
dustry that  will help wean the Rus sian economy off its dominant extractive 
industries. At the same time, the rcs are firmly connected to the Soviet past 
through the school system and its curriculum, which formed generations of 
formidable Soviet mathematicians and physicists and even now continues 
to provide the foundation of this community’s distinctive technical skills— 
skills that, based on both the results of international coding contests and the 
opinions of experts, are widely recognized as outstanding.
The Soviet genealogy of  today’s rcs, however, is unusually specific. Un-
like disciplines whose pres ent identity is still framed by their Soviet past 
through substantial continuities in their institutional and sociopo liti cal 
“hardware”— from the Soviet Acad emy of Sciences, to engineers’ factories, 
biologists’ laboratories and agricultural research stations, and physicists’ ac-
celerators and weapons labs— the Rus sian computer scientists’ link to the 
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Soviet period is through “disciplinary software.”17 The rcs are connected to 
the past much more through pedagogical traditions than brick- and- mortar 
laboratories, factories, and professional organ izations (which, in the case of 
the software industry,  were established only in 1999).18 We could say, per-
haps, that while most disciplines had and still have extensive links to many 
parts of the state and government apparatus, the only ele ments of the Soviet 
system that are still directly traceable to  today’s rcs are the schools they 
frequented (especially the fizmat high schools that specialized in math and 
physics), the curriculum they followed, the teachers they had, and the Math 
Olympiads they went to with their fellow math students.
Nonetheless, as some of our chapters show, while the connection be-
tween modern Rus sian computer scientists and the old Soviet system may 
be limited in institutional terms— often confined to the students’ relation-
ship to their schools—it is also quite tight; it may be a small umbilical cord, 
but it is a strong one. Several of our interviewees indicate that it was  those 
personal and pedagogical experiences that made them who they are profes-
sionally, shaping what they perceive as a uniquely Rus sian coding style. This 
is a mark of identity, not just of professional competence, though the two 
halves often merge, turning “Rus sian programmer” into a brand that signi-
fies both origin and quality.
Somewhat paradoxically, the rcs who join the flows of the global brain 
drain do so precisely  because they are Rus sians,  because of the distinctive 
skills they have acquired as Rus sians. In this sense, the brain drain could be 
read as both a source of pride and a curse, or as hope for a  future of tech-
nological and industrial innovation that is si mul ta neously possibly within 
reach and possibly already foreclosed.  Because of their reputation (and 
 because of their inherent mobility and relatively low need for institutional 
support)  these specialists often flow away like oil and gas— precisely the re-
sources that Rus sia hopes to wean itself away from by developing a strong it 
industry. From the Rus sian point of view, brain drain may look like a tragic 
tale of technology transfer.
THE PROJ ECT
From Rus sia with Code is a contribution to science, technology, and innova-
tion studies, focusing si mul ta neously on technological  matters like software 
and it development and on the difficult emergence of the new Rus sian public 
sphere, which is closely tied to the development of an entrepreneurial econ-
omy and a new set of related values.19 Entrepreneurship is about competition 
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(rather than government plans and policies) but it also requires some notion 
of trust that is not tied to one’s place in a rigid social configuration like 
a Soviet kollektiv, or collective (Kharkhordin 1999).20 As direct proponents 
of the digital economy, rcs are thus involved in developing new tools and 
products while also articulating new (and distinctly non- Soviet) forms of 
collaboration and accountability. Paraphrasing the famous Rus sian saying 
that “a poet in Rus sia is more than a poet,” we believe that in the current 
po liti cal Rus sian context, software is about a lot more than software.
Recent anthropological studies of populations of software developers, 
hackers, and hacktivists have shown how their ethos is rooted in technical 
expertise but also in the appreciation of the unique transparency of com-
puter language and the collaborations enabled by that transparency (Cole-
man 2012; Kelty 2008; Levy 2010; Takhteyev 2012). The traditional Merto-
nian divide between the openness of scientific knowledge and proprietary 
views of industrial expertise and secrets ruled out the cultivation of hybrid 
professional identities and ethos.  Whether or not Merton’s divide ever ex-
isted in the past, it seems to have dis appeared  today, as demonstrated by 
the university/industry partnerships that are now the norm in the US and 
Eu rope. At the same time, we also find a growing presence of  free and open 
source software in for- profit environments, suggesting that the shareability 
of code is not seen as antithetical to business and entrepreneurial logic.
The renegotiation of traditional business culture assumptions that often 
goes  under the name of “open innovation”— however hyped and vague that 
notion may be—is central to the kind of economy associated with the it 
industry (Chesbrough 2005).  Because of historical contingencies, however, 
the emergent Rus sian it community engages that “renegotiation” from a dis-
tinctly diff er ent direction. The question is not how to modify the assumptions 
of a liberal economy and its understanding of how, as Yochai Benkler (2006) 
has argued, wealth can be produced by networks, but rather to articulate new 
notions and practices of collective endeavor that bypass the hierarchical and 
top- down modus operandi of the Marxist Leninist tradition.
A team at the Eu ro pean University at Saint Petersburg (eusp) has stud-
ied at length the orga nizational forms mobilized by diff er ent groups of 
con temporary Rus sian technology entrepreneurs (not limited to it), and 
the ways they narrativize their goals and values to themselves and  others 
(Gladarev et al. 2013).21 One of the proj ect’s key findings matched the ob-
servation shared by many historians of Rus sian science and technology;22 
namely, that Rus sian engineers claim to be “taken by their creation” and are 
driven by the “love of their work- in- progress (razrabotka)” (Kharkhordin 
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2014, 36). Interestingly, this is not a feeling they found expressed in their 
interviews of tech entrepreneurs from Finland, South  Korea, and Taiwan 
(Kharkhordin 2014, 27–35). Rus sian tech entrepreneurs (like the earlier Rus-
sian scientists and engineers studied by historians) claimed that both the 
technical work of innovation and the building of a tech startup are  labors of 
love and dedication, quasi- spiritual calls  toward the articulation of the new 
and still embryonic technological system or device.
The emphasis and value, however, is placed on the working prototype 
or on the launching of a com pany rather than on the allegedly less creative 
 labor of bringing the product to market, or growing one’s com pany. Or, to 
reuse the parental meta phors deployed by several interviewees, their narra-
tives emphasize the “delivery” of their  children— the “prototypes”— rather 
than their growing up into mature products or technologies. As “Olga,” an 
academic chemist and entrepreneur, put it:
[As for] all  those  people who  really swarm into business, especially the 
high- tech business, you  really need to be crazy to decide on  doing it. Often, 
I think, they are driven more by, say, a love of their work- in- progress. . . . 
So when they start working on something, at first they are driven, natu-
rally, by all kinds of scientific [impulses]— I want to try this, I want to do 
this. Then, when [they] have done it, [they won der] what it would be like 
in manufactured form. And when someone suddenly asks what it would 
be like in manufactured form, they are stuck.  Because then they also have 
to be involved in commercialization. (Kharkhordin 2014, 37)
The phase between the prototype and the successfully marketed prod-
uct is where  things often come to a halt for aspiring Rus sian entrepreneurs. 
Unlike  those in business cultures where product development traverses a 
path that goes all the way to the market phase with considerations of pricing 
and distribution, Rus sian technological entrepreneurs tend to insulate their 
ideas from such business imperatives. The result of this general posture is 
a long series of failures, from the nineteenth  century onward, which Loren 
Graham compiles in a depressingly long list that would make any venture 
cap i tal ist think thrice before investing money in Rus sia (Graham 2013).
Olga’s narrative, however, shows an in ter est ing new spin on the “love- for- 
the- prototype” model. For her, commercialization is part of the same “work- 
in- progress aesthetics” that motivated her creative work to begin with: “I 
was more involved in [the] realm of innovation, but I did not give chemistry 
up . . .  perhaps they are now on an equal footing. . . .  That is, I both work 
on my own work- in- progress— I have a research group and vari ous grad 
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students— and  there is the commercial part, where as an entrepreneur, I 
manage this work- in- progress myself and put science into practice. I realize 
no one  else but me is as keen on implementing it” (Kharkhordin 2014, 37).
The many interviews collected by the eusp team show that  today’s Rus-
sian tech entrepreneurs still represent themselves as diff er ent from (and su-
perior to) “normal” business  people in that they are not motivated by money 
but by the “love of the work in pro gress”— something that has been desired 
rather than needed, and whose completion is not as compelling as its con-
ception. Of course money is not at all disparaged, and in fact some “fully 
liberalized” entrepreneurs pres ent money making as their prime incentive. 
However, other techno- entrepreneurs, perhaps  those more connected to 
their Soviet backgrounds, pres ent money not just as revenue but as a “sym-
bolic reward”: “An ipo is when shares are put up for sale. My desire is to get 
a high valuation from someone for  every share. . . .  The goal is not to sell . . . 
[but] more to achieve a certain recognition, that yes, B****’s shares are worth 
so much  today. . . .  For a businessman, an ipo is this pure selfeksperiens [self- 
experience]” (Kharkhordin 2014, 10). It is not difficult to see in  these nar-
ratives the reflection of Soviet notions of personhood and work as separate 
from individual economic success— traditional notions that are now being 
merged (largely through the translations of Anglophone business studies lit-
er a ture) with bourgeois concepts of self- realization through creative work 
(Kharkhordin 2014, 23).
Western liberals or neoliberals may argue that this ele ment of the Soviet 
heritage— the dismissal or de- emphasizing of monetary incentives—is an 
obstacle on the path to entrepreneurial culture and should thus be dispensed 
with, the sooner the better. But if we go back to Olga’s remarks we see that 
 there is something  else, something more striking than just the emphasis on 
the “creative purity” of the tech entrepreneur (as opposed to the tech busi-
nessperson). Like many of the other Rus sian interviewees, Olga expresses 
a clearly individualistic view of innovation— “No one  else but me is keen 
to . . .” This does not seem identical to the “rugged individualism” of Western 
entrepreneurs, but more like an emphasis on the agency of the individual 
as distinct from or even opposed to the collectivism of the Soviet period. It 
may be an extension of her ethos as a scientist who, even in the USSR, cul-
tivated a notion of the individual through creative work (though that work 
was done in the interest of the collective).
We believe, then, that the much- documented entrepreneurial failures of 
Rus sian scientists and engineers throughout history may not be the tragic 
outcome of the technological creators’ absolute commitment to the integrity of 
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their creations, taking them to their grave to make them die pure rather than 
grow corrupted. In our view this attachment to an uncompromising model 
of invention may not stem from a chimeric infatuation with  purity, but 
rather signal a mundane lack of trust in collective modes of organ ization— the 
kind of collaborative activities necessary to turn an invention into an inno-
vation. Unlike the operations of the inventor’s mind, bringing an invention 
to market requires a collaborative and adaptable ethos able to encompass the 
love for the inventive pro cess, the love for profit, and the ability to engage 
and sustain collaborations involving both openness and the production 
of commercial value.
This was not something that was cultivated in the USSR, when both sci-
ence and technology  were predominantly managed by the state in a central-
ized fashion, premised on a scientific division of  labor and a hierarchical 
mode of operations. The Soviet system did embody a collective mode of ac-
tion, but not one of collaboration, at least of the kind that seems to animate 
the so- called knowledge economy. But even if not flexible enough to foster 
innovation, it was nonetheless a collective mode of action, and its collapse 
(coupled with the generally negative feelings that Rus sians had left for this 
par tic u lar model or experience) seemed to make the very idea of a collective 
mode of action unpalatable to the post- Soviet generation.
Studying the rcs communities, both in Rus sia and abroad, has thus al-
lowed us to analyze the pro cesses (and the remarkable challenges) through 
which a new entrepreneurial culture emerges— not just a technology or 
“commercial mentality” but the entire skill set required to work with  others 
by developing grassroots norms of both trust and accountability. Compar-
ing rcs operating in Rus sia with  those who migrate abroad or collaborate 
with foreign colleagues provides additional evidence on the role that the 
possibility of geographic mobility plays on their decision to bridge science 
and collective enterprises, and how and where that tends to happen.
TOPICAL CLUSTERS
The volume includes thirteen chapters grouped into four sections: “Coding 
Collectives”; “Outward- Looking Enclaves”; “Rus sian Maps”; and “Bridges 
and Mismatches.”
“Coding Collectives” focuses on the relation one finds in  today’s Rus sia 
between certain kinds of coding and certain kinds of professional and po-
liti cal identities, as new social formations are coming into being through 
a shared concern with the development of computer languages, software, 
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and apps. The relation between code and identity (in this case disciplin-
ary identity) goes all the way back to the establishment of Soviet computer 
science and its differentiation from both mathe matics and cybernetics, but 
identity issues take very diff er ent forms among con temporary Rus sian civic 
hackers (for whom code is both a means and a form of politics), as well as 
among the employees of Yandex, for whom reading and writing code func-
tions as a rite of initiation into the professional culture and coding style of 
that corporation.
Scholars of computer codes, especially Friedrich Kittler (2008, 40–47), 
have long pointed to their duality. Computer codes are written in languages 
that need to be executed by machines, thus leaving no space for semantic 
ambiguities. At the same time, and for the same reason,  there is a specific 
sociality to code in the sense that it sets specific conditions of possibility for 
the ways in which  people can collaborate with and through it. Programs in-
structing a computer to perform a certain task may be written in a wide vari-
ety of languages, with diff er ent individual coding styles. But this remarkable 
diversity does not imply semantic ambiguity. Any language that is compil-
able and executable by a computer needs to be ambiguity  free, which also 
means that  those  humans who collaborate and create new publics through 
codes and coding are facilitated in  doing so by the fact that their codes are 
unambiguous not only to the computer but to their  human partners too. 
The formal linguistic nonambiguity of code offers a po liti cal vector of com-
munity formation by providing a platform for collaboration among  humans 
from diff er ent places and cultures, and with diff er ent values. Of course, ambi-
guities and negotiations do not dis appear but are rather relocated from the 
site of coding to other moments of the collaboration, like discussions about 
its design, goal, structure, maintenance, membership,  etc. But the nimble-
ness and collaboration- enabling features of code  were not always  there.
Just a few de cades ago computer science was associated with large ver-
tically managed facilities, with strict access rules, that could be found only 
in a few countries in the world. In chapter 1, Ksenia Tatarchenko recounts 
the Soviet history of that trajectory, looking at Andrey Ershov’s commitment 
to fashion computer science as a discipline with an open and collaborative 
ethos that was rather unusual during the Cold War, possibly foreshadowing 
 later associations between code- based practices, collaboration, and emergent 
communities and publics. Contrary to  today’s popu lar image of Rus sian pro-
grammers as the heirs to the Soviet Union’s kgb, Ershov worked hard 
to promote a distinctly Soviet version of computers, languages, and their 
programmers that  were meant to function as the new pillars of a peaceful 
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civilization uniting the East and the West. Such porous geopolitics are now 
resurfacing in many new experimental coding practices, like the hackathons 
that Ksenia Ermoshina discusses in this volume.
Ermoshina’s chapter on con temporary Rus sian hacktivists offers a win-
dow on the sharp tension between the libertarian values of the Silicon Valley 
ethos and long- held princi ples of communal help that hark back to an ideal-
ized Soviet past. Codes and protocols of information gathering, formatting, 
and sharing have become central to the conversation animating  these emer-
gent collectives, providing not just a means but a form for the new modes 
of po liti cal participation they are developing. Codes also enable quick and 
 efficient collaborations by allowing partners to come together around noth-
ing more than a computer screen— a strikingly minimalist scenario compared 
to the facilities- intensive collaborations one finds in con temporary physics 
or biology.
In the age of laptops and tablets, the new Rus sian excellence in coding 
is no longer tied to large infrastructures or to the strict orga nizational and 
planned structure of Soviet science. But the natu ral experiment that we de-
scribe in  these chapters goes beyond the immediate effects of this new looser 
format of practice. The commerce of codes and coders has created economic 
value that did not and could not exist in the Soviet system, when intangible 
goods  were not recognized sources of national wealth. In her chapter, Marina 
Fedorova looks at Yandex— the darling of Rus sian it companies— and the 
role of its source codes in the socialization of its employees. Unlike the old 
Soviet rules and disciplinary practices that charted the coming into being 
of good communist subjects, the new code is designed not only to instruct 
machines but also to foster communication between employees— a kind of 
communication that has disciplining effects but not preset ones. Also, fa-
miliarity with code gives employees skills that, far from being exclusively of 
local use, become assets that are readily fungible in the  labor market. Read-
ing and writing a com pany’s code fashions one into a corporate subject, but 
also makes one easily and quickly movable beyond that com pany and its 
geo graph i cal location. Computing codes thus have two intriguing features: 
they are said to be computationally universal (when they can simulate any 
Turing machine), but such mechanico- algorithmic universality immediately 
translates into commercial universality. They are inherently mobile in the 
conceptual, technical, and commercial sense of the term, and for the same 
reason. Taken together, the chapters of “Coding Collectives” show some of 
the diff er ent ways in which this duality of code plays out in specific Soviet 
and post- Soviet Rus sian situations.
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“Outward- Looking Enclaves” considers domestic professional it enclaves 
that look abroad for business opportunities, modes of collaboration, or just 
lines of professional escape.  These communities are also the direct heirs to 
the “science cities” that epitomized Soviet science (Josephson 1997).23 Popu-
lated through massive post– World War II internal migrations like  those that 
brought more than fifty thousand scientists and their families to Siberia’s 
Akademgorodok or to smaller communities like Pushchino and Dubna,  these 
cities  were usually shielded from some of the hardships of the Soviet system 
and developed their own cultures as techno- scientific communes, at times 
transgressive of Soviet dogma (Tatarchenko 2013). Before the  actual physical 
movement of scientists and young entrepreneurs away from Rus sia, some 
Soviet science and high- tech communities  were already “moving” not only 
by relocating and concentrating in other parts of the country but also by 
developing outward- looking perspectives.
Since the collapse of the USSR, Akademgorodok has been dubbed the 
“Silicon Forest,” due to the many it startups that have emerged around and 
on the ashes of this former Soviet academic city (Wainwright 2016).  These 
entrepreneurial developments have held on, albeit in mutated form, to their 
older ethos of autonomy and outward- looking perspectives, developing 
models that, as Andrey Indukaev argues in chapter 7, are significantly in de-
pen dent of the Rus sian state while also distinct from the forms of university- 
industry collaboration one finds in the US.
Aleksandra Simonova’s analy sis of Skolkovo— the large technopark recently 
built at the outskirts of Moscow in a collaboration between the Rus sian gov-
ernment and mit— summons the image of the Soviet science city, though 
one that is not just outward looking but actually developed with foreigners to 
mimic as closely as pos si ble emblematic high- tech sites like the Cambridge- 
Boston area or Silicon Valley. At the same time, both Skolkovo and the much 
smaller and more informal hackerspaces also discussed by Simonova are in-
ward and outward looking at the same time. Skolkovo blends the traditional 
Soviet model of the science city with Western ecologies like Silicon Valley and 
its many global reproductions. Similarly, the Moscow hackerspaces borrow 
and exemplify a kind of collaborative space that has become emblematic of 
the global innovation scene. Still, despite their obvious outward orientation, 
their goals are distinctly inward: to create suitable environments for Rus sian 
it innovators to occupy at home. They try to bring the West into Rus sia so 
that Rus sian innovators do not feel they have to leave for the West.
In Vladivostok, at Rus sia’s eastern edge, the gaze of the it community 
turned outward not as a byproduct of the Soviet government’s centralized 
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planning of the military- scientific complex or of the more recent but equally 
centralized attempts by the Rus sian government to develop domestic Silicon 
Valleys. On the shores of the Pacific, looking outward came with the territory, 
from being at the periphery of the empire, much closer to China, Japan, 
 Korea, and Pacific networks of exchange than to Moscow. As Aleksandra 
Masalskaya and Zinaida Vasilyeva show in chapter 4, the it community  there 
emerged from the computing needs of the local burgeoning Japa nese car 
import business, to then grow into a broader Siberian network of prac ti tion-
ers for whom Moscow often remained effectively beyond the horizon. A 
diff er ent genealogy is found in a diff er ent periphery, around Kazan— the capi-
tal of the largely Muslim Republic of Tatarstan in the Rus sian Federation’s 
southern Volga region.  There, as Kontareva describes, a strong governmen-
tal investment in building a Western- style it innovation ecol ogy (involving 
technoparks, university incubators,  etc.) is part of an attempt to “brand” the 
Republic of Tatarstan and its capital as an up- and- coming region, connected 
to Moscow but inspired by the West— a West that is not merely imitated but 
Rus sianized, mobilized as part of a branding narrative to turn Tatarstan into 
an emblem of the new “tech” Rus sia.
In other places, however, the West is no longer what it used to be, thus 
confusing in in ter est ing ways what “inward-” and “outward- looking” may 
mean. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the exit of several former 
republics from the reconstituted Rus sian Federation, recently in de pen dent 
nations like Estonia have reinvented themselves as essentially Western, in 
opposition to Rus sia. Surprisingly, it has become a crucial ele ment of Es-
tonia’s re- invention as a nation, whose figurative birth date is pinned on a 
series of distributed denial- of- service (DDoS) attacks in 2007 by Rus sian 
hackers, who had blocked many of the country’s servers, returning Esto-
nians to pre- internet life. This episode was central to the articulation of the 
figure of the “new Estonia”— a small but strong new country that had to be 
defended from similar attacks by developing fine computing skills, start-
ing with the code training of elementary school  children. Unlike Tatarstan, 
which borrows Western images of digital innovation ecologies to brand itself 
as the epitome of the new Rus sia, Estonia relies on the menacing figure of 
Rus sian government hackers to brand itself as e- Estonia, which Wired has 
termed the “the most advanced digital society in the world.”24 In  doing so, 
however, it relies on the skills and pedagogical tradition left  behind by the 
Soviet computer scientists.
The short interlude “Rus sian Maps” marks the book’s transition from 
domestic post- Soviet scenarios to properly diasporic ones, offering a com-
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prehensive map of the Rus sian it industry, its short history and markets, its 
major players, and its place in the context of the general Rus sian industrial 
and policy landscape.  Because the previous sections have aimed at specific 
questions and regions, they have, as a  whole, tended to describe some trees 
or impor tant branches, but not necessarily the forest. Dmitrii Zhikharevich’s 
interlude operates on a diff er ent scale, providing a grid on which the previ-
ous chapters can be placed, enabling the visibility of their pos si ble mutual 
connections, as well as  those with other areas of the Rus sian it territory.
 After surveying the ongoing policy debates and initiatives to wean Rus sia 
from its dependence on extractive industries (and the perception of it as a 
 viable alternative or strong complement to oil and gas), Zhikharevich maps 
the clustering of Rus sian computer scientists’ activities around a few major 
centers in the Rus sian Federation. Presenting both the natu ral economic 
 impulse for the concentration of it activities in the Moscow area and recent 
efforts to create centers of academic excellence and technoparks in vari ous 
more “provincial” cities, he addresses the main strengths, weaknesses, and 
paradoxes of  today’s Rus sian it industry.
The book’s final section is entitled “Bridges and Mismatches.” It docu-
ments how the Anglo- Saxon way of life and work is central among the mod-
els animating the conversations of Rus sian computer scientists and software 
prac ti tion ers. It can be invoked in diff er ent ways, for diff er ent purposes. It 
can be a foil to belittle the US techno- scientific education compared to the 
pedagogical excellence that Rus sia claims to have inherited from the Soviet 
system; but it can also be mobilized in the opposite direction, to point to 
limitations in the Rus sian innovation ecosystem, like its relative lack of sup-
port for prospective entrepreneurs, its lax attitude  toward intellectual prop-
erty, or the general absence of trust among young professionals that often 
forces emergent Rus sian entrepreneurs to pick their business partners from 
among close friends or  people they already know. The aspiration to identify 
oneself as American or British (or at least aligned with  those lifestyles and 
business cultures that, while virtually global, are effectively Anglophone) is 
thus not necessarily the manifestation of frustrations about being Rus sian 
but rather about trying to operate in  today’s Rus sia.
 There are few venues through which  people can learn how to perform the 
roles they aspire to except by connecting to the English- based professional 
communications networks of it and computer scientists, or by  doing con-
tract work for foreign companies offshoring to Rus sia, which is often a train-
ing in the “ways of the West.”  There, rcs pick up the concepts and tricks of 
the trade, learning to walk the walk and talk the talk.  These newly acquired 
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skills may be deployed at home, to develop new entrepreneurial trajectories 
that draw from Western models, but they can also function as “professional 
passports” for  those who wish to move abroad.
Compared to the few migration options that occasionally opened up 
 during the Soviet period (which  were ethnicity- based, complicated, costly, 
and possibly dangerous), the path of  today’s Rus sian high- skill brain drain 
may appear to be as easy as crossing a bridge. But  there are very many diff er-
ent bridges, depending on the specific professional niche, country, lifestyle 
expectations, and po liti cal inclinations of the émigrés, and on the time of 
the crossing. And  there are also surprises about what one may find at the 
other end of  those bridges. Rather than producing case studies of scenarios 
that are often covered in the popu lar media— young, smart, and aggressive 
Rus sian hackers flying straight to Silicon Valley or Seattle to join Google or 
Microsoft, or to London or Berlin to work for Goldman Sachs or Deutsche 
Bank— this section looks at more complicated, and not necessarily more 
successful, scenarios, places where the émigrés’ “Anglo- Saxon dreams” may 
not fully match what they find at the other end of the bridge, or where the 
brain drain, far from being near instantaneous as the image suggests, is a 
long and complicated affair, as in Irina Antoschyuk’s win dow on the vari ous 
stages of migration of rcs to British academia in chapter 10.
Differences in professional and institutional culture do not seem to be 
particularly salient in that specific kind of migration— the journals are the 
same and, good or bad, a department is a department. What makes a 
 significant difference in the migration pro cess and its aftermath is, instead, 
the timeline and steps of the migration decision, which typically spreads over 
a few years, growing through conferences, visits, and short- term fellowships. 
The specific steps, and their timing, change the conditions  under which the 
move takes (or does not take) place, as well as the émigré’s ability to move 
alone, with a team, or with the possibility to function as a bridgehead for 
subsequent brain drain waves. More than travel, migration looks like alliance 
making, both in the UK and back in Rus sia.
And then  there are cases where,  because of the time and circumstances 
of the migration, the “Anglo- Saxon dream” was not part of the equation. 
Its absence, however, was consequential nevertheless. In chapter 11, Diana 
Kurkovsky West looks at predominantly Jewish it prac ti tion ers who mi-
grated to Boston during the Soviet period and, while having many of the 
same technical skills as more recent Rus sian emigrants,  were not familiar 
with, and thus did not embrace, the Anglo- Saxon vision of the daring high- 
tech entrepreneur. Uncomfortable with or unskilled in the entrepreneurial 
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and managerial culture they encountered in Boston, they opted for “upper- 
middle tech” jobs.  These  careers led to upper- middle- class status and life-
style, but not to startup entrepreneurial glory. This earlier population may 
have had research- grade skills, and in fact often obtained positions in cor-
porate labs, but did not associate startup culture with the “good life,”  either 
materially or morally.
In chapter  12, Marina Fedorova analyzes another mismatch involving 
Rus sian immigrants’ and native Israelis’ cultural and professional values. Like 
the native Israelis, the immigrants prize education, but, reflecting Rus sian 
cultural values and expectations, they identify education almost exclusively 
with university training. Israeli- born teen agers, instead, understand the key 
role that military tech training plays in the  career of  future it engineers, as 
well as its function as a networking site from which many startups emerge. 
One of the more manageable migration trajectories for Soviet Jews from the 
1970s onward, Israel has paradoxically not been a destination where their 
technical skills and training have shone, as has instead been the case in vir-
tually all other countries.
 After having spanned several countries and continents, the volume comes 
to an end by almost coming back “home” to look at the shortest and most ac-
cessible brain drain path— that between Rus sia and Finland. But while geo-
graph i cally diminutive, this distance captures specific cultural and po liti cal 
choices. In the final chapter, Lyubava Shatokhina shows that  here too migra-
tion choices are guided by views of the Anglo- Saxon way of life and work, 
and how the prospective émigré values them. For instance, a key  factor that 
Rus sian software specialists consider in relocating to Finland is the appeal-
ing combination of professional autonomy and the country’s socially lib-
eral context. Autonomy means that scientists and engineers can pursue 
their work away from the intense pace they associate (based on evidence or 
 imagined scenarios) with Silicon Valley and its privileging of competition 
over a commitment to the welfare state. What they identify as the desir-
able social context of their activities is described in terms that resonate with 
the ideals of Northern Eu ro pean social democracy, as opposed to the cut-
throat competition typical both of the Anglo- Saxon models and of the wild 
“everything- goes” Rus sia of the 1990s. The ideals of professional and social 
life espoused by  these immigrants are not far removed from  those of Soviet 
society, and the Finnish lifestyle and po liti cal culture allow them to feel that 
they live in a place where at least some of the old Soviet commitment to the 
collective and to the re spect of one’s work is preserved, while being articu-
lated in a much more appealing demo cratic framework.
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NOTES
 1. Partial En glish translations of Marinichev’s speech and critical responses are 
reproduced in Fitzpatrick 2015a and 2015b.
 2. Among the vast lit er a ture about high- tech and academic migrations and mo-
bility, see Agrawal 2006; Azoulay, Zivin, and Wang 2010; Breschi and Lissoni 
2009; Kuznetsov 2006; and Saxenian 1999.
 3. The questionnaire used for the interviews was designed to help understand 
the practice of computer science or information technology in the context of 
the migration strategies of our in for mants. One of the questions that we pur-
sued looked at the exchanges between Rus sians who moved abroad and  those 
who stayed in the Federation. Several of  these interviews  were transcribed, and 
some  were translated into En glish. They are accessible at Rcs.eu.spb.ru,  after 
registration.
 4. This is effectively identical to what Loren Graham (1994, 127) has called the 
“blackboard princi ple,” that is, that a discipline that could be effectively pursued 
with just a blackboard and a piece of chalk could thrive in the Soviet Union. The 
impor tant difference, however, is that in the case of software, the “blackboard 
rule” applies to any country, not just the former USSR or modern Rus sia. For 
a contrasting account stressing the peculiar “Sovietness” of applied math, see 
Dalmedico 2004.
 5.  These policies  were not always in place. For example, in the immediate 
 aftermath of the collapse of the USSR the Rus sian government was unable to 
provide research funding (or even salaries) within the system that connected 
techno- scientific research to the military, causing much of the better part of the 
scientific community to depart for greener pastures (see Gokhberg and Nekip-
elova 2001).
 6. Years  later,  after the business relation had developed and grown strong, Khotin 
realized that, in comparable circumstances, he should have received some eq-
uity in the Finnish business he had helped to develop rather than simply being 
paid as a contractor, but “I did not understand that I needed to ask. This is my 
Rus sian mentality. I have learned now that you need to ask. But at that time I 
would look for them to offer and if they did not offer I would not ask. And of 
course why would they be crazy enough to offer me stock for which I had never 
asked?” (Khotin, interviewed in Cook Report 2009, 11).
 7. Kharkhordin 2014, 21; citing a 2011 interview with “Timur,” a techno- 
entrepreneur from Tatarstan: “I studied, read a lot, and listened to lots of 
audiobooks.”
 8. Similarly, Rus sian businesses that have become successful  doing offshore soft-
ware development for foreign clients have often done so by “becoming local 
onshore,” that is, by hiring local professionals (say, in the US) to inform and 
align the Rus sian com pany with local business practices and  legal arrange-
ments (Feakins 2009).
 9.  There are still only a few business schools in Rus sia and it is unclear  whether 
a formal training  toward an mba— a degree predicated on the assumption that 
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gradu ates  will go to work in business contexts that are comparable to  those 
modeled by the curriculum—is needed, or even useful, given the fluidity and 
emergent quality of Rus sian business scenarios post-1991.
 10. Unlike other countries that have recently emerged as software power houses 
(e.g., India, Ireland, Israel, and China), Rus sians had very low En glish proficiency.
 11. “But I also came to understand that I needed to establish Arcadia on a proper 
professional level. I was getting useful feedback . . .  from a guy named Ted Mc-
Mahon from Boston University. Ted came to Rus sia to teach En glish and I was 
using him to teach my programmers En glish. I hired him to teach me how to 
write better business letters in En glish and I took him with me once on a trip to 
Helsinki to help in my negotiations” (Cook Report 2009, 11).
 12. This is a large, if poorly quantified, population. Many Rus sian software devel-
opers work in- house for Rus sian companies, writing the software products 
needed by their employers.  Because of a combination of low wages and the 
specificity of Rus sian  legal, business, and accounting practices (and their fre-
quent changes), it is often both cheaper and better to develop one’s own soft-
ware than to purchase off- the- shelf products from Eu ro pean and US software 
providers (Peterson 2005).
 13. For  later developments, see Soldatov and Borogan 2015.
 14. On the global spread of the software industry, see Aneesh 2006;  Arora and 
Gambardella 2005; Biao 2006; McFarlan, Jia, and Wong 2012; Popkin and Iyen-
gar 2007; Takhteyev 2012.
 15. Aleksey Andreyev, chief editor of Webplanet.ru; quoted in rt 2016.
 16. The contrast between hopes and realities can be easily grasped by comparing 
spief 2012 with Appell 2015. See also Balzer 2016.
 17. A succinct but comprehensive institutional map of USSR science and technol-
ogy is in Berry 1988.
 18. Russoft (http:// russoft . org / ), originally named “FortRoss,”  after a nineteenth- 
century Rus sian settlement in Northern California.
 19. On the last Soviet generation (or the first generation of Rus sian entrepreneurs) 
and how their entrepreneurial skills started to develop during the late 1980s, see 
Yurchak 2002.
 20. On the distrust of collective action in post-1991 Rus sia, see also Howard 2003.
 21. Additional material can be found at https:// eu . spb . ru / sts / projects / item / 4417 
- technological - entrepreneurship. The detailed results of this proj ect are in 
Bychkova, forthcoming.
 22. The most recent statement of this position is Graham 2013.
 23. In parallel to the science cities, the Soviets also developed closed cities where 
techno- scientific work was done, mostly for military application, in secrecy, or 
at least isolation (Brown 2013).
 24. https:// e - estonia . com / .
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